Bajaj Case Study

Financial Management at Bajaj Auto Bajaj Auto Limited is one of India's largest two-wheeler manufacturers. As the dominant player until the early 1990s, Bajaj's market share declined from 49. 3% in 1994, to 38. 9% in 1999 with the entry of major competitors like Hero Honda. Bajaj has initiated several measures to regain its market share and strengthen its competitive position. The case discusses the financial strategy pursued by Bajaj. Financial Management at Bajaj Auto We want to get back the leadership position in the two-wheeler segment and will use the cash if required to do so.However, in current volatile market conditions (not to forget the Japanese and their huge cash reserves), we would rather have the security of cash any day. We are competing not only with Indian companies, but also with large foreign two-wheeler companies, many of whom have much deeper pockets than ours. While our surplus cash will assist us in future growth, it also acts as a deterrent to others from indu lging in predatory pricing tactics – Sanjiv Bajaj, Vice-President Finance, Bajaj Auto Limited. 1 IntroductionIn 2003, Bajaj Auto Limited (Bajaj) was one of India’s largest manufacturers of both two and three-wheelers. The three-wheelers, also known as autorickshaws, were unique to the South Asian region. The company recorded revenue of Rs. 5125. 73 crores representing a 13% increase over the previous year 2. Once the unchallenged market leader, Bajaj trailed Hero Honda in the late 1990s. Bajaj’s market share declined from 49. 3% in 1994, to 38. 9% in 1999. 3 Thereafter, Bajaj had initiated several measures to regain its market share and strengthened its competitive position.In 2003, Bajaj had a workforce of 12,000 employees and a network of 422 dealers and over 1,300 authorised service centers. 4 The Indian Two-Wheeler Industry Two-wheelers had become the standard mode of transportation in many of India’s large urban centers. Use of two-wheelers in the ru ral areas had also increased significantly in the 1990s. The birth of the Indian two-wheeler industry could be traced to the early 1950s, when Automobile Products of India (API) started manufacturing scooters in the country.While API initially dominated the scooter market with its Lambrettas, it was Bajaj which rapidly emerged as the unchallenged leader in the scooter industry. A number of government and private enterprises who entered the scooter segment, had disappeared from the market by the turn of the century. The License Raj that existed prior to economic liberalization (1940s-1980s) in India, did not allow foreign players to enter the market, making it an ideal breeding ground for local players. But the Raj also hurt the growth of the industry by imposing various restrictions.In the mid-80s, the government started permitting foreign companies to enter the Indian market, through minority joint ventures. During this period, the twowheeler market witnessed a boom with Japanese p layers like Honda, Suzuki, Yamaha and Kawasaki, entering the market through joint ventures. 1 2 3 4 M. Anand, ? Is Munjal Being Too Generous Businessworld, 19th May 2003. B1 Source: Prowess Database. Gita Piramal, Sumantra Goshal and Sudeep Budhiraja, ? Transformation of Bajaj Auto Ltd,? Lessons in Excellence Case Contest, www. thesmartmanager. om, February-March, 2003. Source: Bajaj Auto Limited Annual Report 2003. 109 Financial Insights Figure (i) Indian Motorcycle Market Source: Honda Annual Report 2003. Foreign players quickly changed the rules of the game. From a supplier’s market, it became a buyer’s market. Companies tried to outdo each other in terms of style, price and fuel efficiency. The technological expertise that the foreign collaborators brought to the market place helped increase the overall quality of the products quite significantly. In the early 2000s, the competition intensified further.In 2000, Honda announced its intentions to set up a 100% subsid iary to manufacture scooters and motorcycles. Exhibit I Comparative Valuation of the Leading Companies Source: Motilal Oswal, Equity Research, February 2003. The Indian two-wheeler industry witnessed remarkable growth rates since 2000, due to a host of factors like fall in interest rates, availability of finance and affordable prices relative to the growing purchasing power. Despite the impressive growth rate of the last few years, two-wheeler penetration still remained low in the country.Analysts believed, increasing urbanization, expanding cities, lack of other modes of transportation and favourable demographics would support double-digit growth in the coming decade. The Indian two-wheeler industry could be broadly classified into three major segments— scooters, motorcycles and mopeds5. Until the early 1990s, locally manufactured scooters with gears dominated the markets. But in recent times, demand 5 Mopeds were small motorcycles, with less engine power which were priced l ow and were aimed at the low-income market. 110 Financial Management at Bajaj Auto or scooters had tapered off, while that for motorcycles looked buoyant. The motorcycle market in India had about tripled in size over the past 10 years 6. In 2002, the two-wheeler industry demand totaled 5 million units, making India the second largest market in the world after China 7. Exhibit II Two Wheelers Industry: Changing Dynamics Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total Two wheelers (unit sold) 1,503,172 1,763,210 2,208,231 2,660,005 2,965,474 3,042,347 3,403,471 3,776,719 3,745,516 4,318,531 5,053,562 Geared scooters 41. 8% 43. 3% 42. 6% 40. 6% 38. 4% 35. 4% 32. % 25. 9% 16. 0% 12. 3% 6. 7% Ungeared scooters 9. 4% 7. 9% 8. 6% 9. 1% 8. 9% 8. 8% 8. 3% 10. 0% 10. 9% 9. 5% 10. 5% Motorcycles 20. 2% 21. 6% 23. 9% 24. 8% 27. 1% 30. 0% 34. 6% 42. 7% 54. 1% 66. 2% 74. 4% Mopeds 20. 0% 17. 6% 15. 1% 16. 8% 16. 5% 15. 5% 14. 6% 14. 1% 12. 9% 8. 7% 6. 2% Stepthrus 8. 6% 9. 6% 9. 8% 8. 7% 9. 1% 10. 3% 9. 8% 7. 3% 6. 1% 3. 3% 2. 2% Source: Bajaj Auto Annual Report 2002-03. Background Note The Bajaj group was founded by Jamnalal Bajaj in the 1930s. His eldest son Kamalnayan established Bajaj Auto, the flagship of the Bajaj group, in 1945, as a private limited company.From 1948 to 1959, Bajaj imported scooters and three wheelers from Italy and sold them in India. In 1959, the company obtained a license to manufacture scooters and motorized three wheeler vehicles. In 1960, it entered into a technical collaboration with Piaggio of Italy and got the right to manufacture and market Piaggio’s Vespa brand scooters and three wheelers in India. The same year, it went public. Bajaj’s first full-fledged manufacturing facility at Akurdi (Bombay-Pune Road) was inaugurated in 1960. Scooter production commenced in 1961, followed by three wheeler production in 1962.Bajaj’s scooters and three wheelers started selling under the Bajaj brand name only in 197 1, when the agreement with Piaggio expired. Till the 1980s, Bajaj scooters were so popular that the basic strategy was long production runs along with a constant focus on costs. In 1984, Bajaj established its second plant (1000-acre plant) at Waluj, Aurangabad. Scooter production at this plant started in 1986, followed by three wheeler production in 1987 and scooterettes and motorcycle production in 1990 & 1991, respectively. 6 7 Source: Honda Annual Report 2003.China was number one with an annual production and sales of over 10 million. 111 Financial Insights As Bajaj’s products were in great demand, the company did not feel the need to introduce new products or upgrade its old models. The Chetak, which accounted for 60% of Bajaj’s scooter sales, did not even have an electronic ignition. The model’s 2stroke engine also had an emission problem that was quite serious by international standards. As competition became intense and the market was flooded with increas ing numbers of models, Bajaj’s market share declined.During this period, Bajaj also followed a highly centralized, paternalistic management style. In the early 1990s, as the motorcycle market began to expand and became an attractive proposition, Bajaj lost ground. Though Bajaj had a presence in the motorcycle segment with its KB100 and 4S Champion, it did not take the segment seriously enough. Bajaj believed, motorcycles were a temporary aberration and people would return to scooters. But the scooter market kept shrinking and Bajaj was relegated to fourth place in the motorcycle market. Exhibit III Comparative Analysis: Motorcycle Sales (Number)Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Bajaj Auto 32,028 34,672 42,080 75,067 89,675 129,263 137,717 200,132 255,129 421,966 670,117 % Share 10 14 14 17 16 18 17 19 17 22 23 Hero Honda 134,801 127,803 150,456 183,131 230,194 168,936 407,563 530,607 761,700 1,029,391 1,425,302 % Share 44 51 50 42 40 38 50 50 50 53 5 0 TVS Motors 33,744 30,085 42,080 53,120 125,286 164,083 211,667 268,099 326,357 354,497 450,113 % Share 11 12 18 20 22 23 26 25 21 18 16 Others 108,601 59,066 56,894 89,643 132,922 146,625 60,674 64,529 177,704 123,472 312,547 Total 309,174 251,626 302,550 435,053 578,077 708,907 817,621 1,063,367 1,520,890 1,929,326 2,858,079Source: Society of Indian Automobile Manufacturers. In the late 1990s, Bajaj with the support of Kawasaki, started producing motorcycles. The result was an aggressively priced Boxer 100cc motorcycle in 1997, about Rs. 8000 cheaper than Hero Honda. As Bajaj’s volumes increased, it started pushing prices down by value engineering, localization and better capacity utilization that cut its costs by Rs. 4000 per vehicle. Exhibit IV Bajaj: Major Models Category Motorcycle Wind BYK Pulsar Eliminator 112 Products Year of Introduction 2003 2003 2002 2001 Financial Management at Bajaj Auto Category Caliber Products Boxer CT Boxer AT 4S Champion KB 100 LegendYear of Introduction 1998 1997 1997 1991 1987 1998 1976 1972 2000 1998 1990 1986 1987 Geared Scooters Super Chetak Saffire Ungeared Scooters Spirit Sunny M80 Major M80 Major 4S Step-Thrus Source: www. bajajauto. com In early 1998, Bajaj established a new plant (Rs. 3. 15 billion investment in 200-acre plot) at Chakan near Pune for its future generation vehicles. The new plant specialized in plastic bodied and tubular structure scooters. Bajaj’s relatively high level of backward integration helped it to keep raw material costs well below the industry average. For example, the company bought raw materials in bulk for itself as well as for its suppliers.For most of the two-wheeler companies, material costs accounted for about 70% of operating income, but for Bajaj it was only 57% in 1998, the lowest in the industry. In 1998, Bajaj was ranked India’s fifth most valuable company 8. Internationally, it was the world’s largest scooter producer and the fourth largest two-whe eler manufacturer after Hero Honda, Yamaha and Suzuki. But the delay in realizing the potential of motorcycle segment by Bajaj, allowed Hero Honda to race ahead to become the market leader in 2001. During 2000-01, Bajaj entered into non-life and life insurance business along with Allianz AG of Germany, one of the largest insurance companies in the world. Two companies were set up: Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Company Ltd and Allianz Bajaj Life Insurance Company Limited.Bajaj and Allianz signed two separate joint venture agreements for these two businesses and respectively committed 74% and 26% of the initial share capital of Rs110 crore in case of the general insurance venture and Rs150 crore in case of the life insurance venture. Bajaj received Rs. 1. 17 billion from Allianz as goodwill. In 2001-02, Bajaj Allianz General Insurance issued the largest number of policies among all private players in the non-life segment, and became the leader in this line of business. Allianz Bajaj Life Insurance commenced operations in October 2001. 8 ?The BT 500,? Business Today, 7th September 1998. 113 Financial Insights Exhibit V Bajaj vs. Competitors: Major Models in Different Segments in 2003 Segments BYK Economy (Priced Rs. 27,000 – Rs. 37,000) Executive (Priced Rs. 38,000 – Rs. 5,000) Premium (Priced Rs. 45,000 – Rs. 75,000) Style (Priced above Rs. 75,000) Boxer AT Boxer AR (K-Tec) Boxer CT Delux (KTec) Caliber (K-Tec) Caliber Croma Caliber 115 Pulsar 150 Pulsar 150 (self-start) Pulsar 180 CD100 SS Dawn Splendor Passion Ambition Disc CBZ Disc CBZ (selfstart) Bajaj Auto Hero Honda TVS Motors No Competition Samurai Max 100R Max DLX Victor Fiero Fiero DLX Fiero ES Crux Crux R Libero Enticer Yamaha Eliminator No Competition Note: List is not exhaustive. Source: Compiled from various sources by ICFAI Knowledge Center. The shift in preference from geared to nongeared scooters continued in 2002, resulting in a 35% decline in yearly sales.The company†™s market share in the ungeared scooter market declined due to lack of models. Both LML and Honda Motorcycles strengthened their foothold in 2002 after the launch of ‘Nova' and ‘Dio' respectively. Bajaj Auto's ‘Spirit', the ungeared scooter, commanded around 25% market share in the below 100 cc category. Bajaj was one of the very few companies manufacturing three-wheelers in the world. It commanded a monopoly in the domestic market with a market share of above 80%. The rest was shared by Bajaj Tempo, Greaves Ltd and Scooters India. The company saw a sharp rise in three-wheeler demand. In early 2002, the market grew by 23%. Bajaj had also commenced the commercial production of goods carriers.In 2002, this segment generated 22% of the company’s profits. The profit per three-wheeler was estimated to be 2. 5-3 times that of a motorcycle. Bajaj gained market share in the motorcycle segment through its models like ‘Pulsar' and ‘Boxer AR'. Boxer virtu ally created the four-stroke economy segment and Pulsar expanded the lifestyle segment. Pulsar’s volumes surpassed the most optimistic expectations in terms of volumes. In February 2003, Bajaj launched ‘Caliber 115' and steadied its presence in the executive motorcycle segment. The new model registered sales of 25,706 units in March 2003. 114 Financial Management at Bajaj Auto Financial ManagementBajaj earned bulk of its revenue from the automotive business. In 2003, motorcycles dominated the automotive segment, accounting for 55 % of its revenues. In 2002-03, Bajaj achieved a turnover of Rs. 5071 crore and earning before interest, taxation, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) of Rs. 817 crore. EBITDA as a percentage of net sales and other operating income increased from 16. 8 % in 2001-02 to 19 % in 2002-03. Return on operating capital, which had dipped to a low of 14% in 2000-01, increased to 60% in 2002-03. Bajaj continued its efforts to drive top-line growth, imp rove operational efficiency, cut costs and improve economies of scale.Working Capital Bajaj continued to minimize its overall working capital. Debtors declined from Rs. 198 crores on 31st March 2002, to Rs. 167 crore on 31st March 2003 – a reduction of 16%. Bajaj succeeded in reducing inventory levels by using the direct on-line delivery of materials from vendors. Inventory of raw materials and components declined from seven days as on 31st March 2002, to six days as on 31st March 2003, and spare parts for replacement market from 42 days to 31 days. The inventory of finished goods however increased from six days to nine days because of the sluggish market. 9 Exhibit VI Bajaj: Operating Working Capital (Rs Million)Source: Bajaj Auto Annual Report 2002-03. Cost Structure Raw materials, advertising and marketing, and indirect taxes (excise, etc) were the major cost heads for Bajaj. During 2002-03, through its continuous efforts in value engineering and improving relations with t he vendors, Bajaj was able to reduce its 9 Bajaj Auto Annual Report 2002-03. 115 Financial Insights material costs. The share of materials to net sales and other operating income reduced from 63. 3 % in 2001-02 to 62 % in 2002-03, while the share of stores and tools was contained at 1. 5 % of net sales and other operating income. 10 Labor costs for 2002-03 included a sum of Rs. 461 million (Rs. 3 million in 2001-02) towards compensation paid to employees under the voluntary retirement scheme. A total of 1,106 employees opted for the scheme, which had a payback period of two years. Bajaj’s labor costs made up 4. 66% of its total revenue in 2002-03. 11 Despite a 16. 5% increase in net sales and other operating income – from Rs. 36. 96 billion in 2001-02 to Rs. 43. 06 billion in 2002-03, factory and administration costs had come down from 5. 3% of net sales and operating income to 4. 3%. This was the result of a thorough review of fixed costs with each plant head. Sales a nd after sales expenses were around 6. 7 % of net sales and other operating income. In 2003, Bajaj’s advertising and marketing expenditures were Rs 233. 9 crore (8. 61% of its total revenue), whereas Hero Honda’s expenditures were Rs. 147. 01 crore (4. 16% of total revenue) and TVS’ were Rs. 212. 49 crore (11. 06% of total revenue). Bajaj’s total indirect tax expenses were Rs. 601. 22 crore in comparison to Hero Honda’s Rs. 9. 75 crore and TVS’ Rs. 435. 77 crore in 2003. 12 Investments Bajaj invested its surplus funds in secured and fixed investment securities like G-Secs, T-Bills, etc. The return earned by Bajaj on its treasury portfolio was comparable with the return earned by the top mutual funds. During 2002-03, Bajaj reduced its equity investments and concentrated more on the G-Sec and bond market.Thus, the market value of the portfolio changed from a diminution in value to cost in 2002, to an appreciation in value to cost of Rs. 343 mi llion in March 2003. During 2002-03, Bajaj provided Rs. 26. 7 million towards impairment in the carrying costs of its investment portfolio. In addition, continuing its efforts to liquidate non-performing assets, Bajaj booked a total loss of Rs. 853 million. This loss was set off against gains on sale of assets of Rs. 1, 067 million that resulted in a net gain of Rs. 214 million. 13 Figure (ii) Bajaj: Liability Structure, 2003 Source: Prowess Database. 10 11 12 13 Bajaj Auto Annual Report, 2002-03. Source: Prowess Database.Source: Prowess Database. Bajaj Auto Annual Report, 2002-03. 116 Financial Management at Bajaj Auto Exhibit VII Bajaj: Investment of Surplus Funds (Rs. million) Source: Bajaj Auto Annual Report, 2002-03. Exhibit: VIII Income from Investments (Rs Million) 2002-2003 Dividends Interest on debentures and bonds Interest on government securities Interest on inter-corporate deposits and other loans Income from mutual fund units Lease rent and equalization Profit on sale o f investments Interest on fixed deposits Others Total Interest on tax refunds Total non-operating income Non-operating expenses Net non-operating income Source: Bajaj Auto Annual Report, 2002-03. 17 127 408 405 239 44 214 2 11 1,450 1,450 274 1,176 2001-2002 592 291 18 364 79 234 6 1,584 18 1,602 436 1,166 Financial Insights Return on Capital In early 2003, Bajaj maintained a free cash reserve of Rs 2,700 crore. The management had no intention of reducing that cash pile in the near future. Meanwhile, analysts argued14 that retaining surplus cash would only dilute a company's Return on Capital Employed (ROCE) and, over a period of time, destroy shareholder value. Bajaj had a capital employed of Rs 4,000 crore, of which only Rs 1,300 crore was deployed in its two-wheeler operations. This generated an excellent ROCE of 60%. But the remaining Rs 2,700 crore of idle cash, earned a return of only 17%.As a result, Bajaj Auto's overall ROCE was 31%, far lower than Hero Honda's 95%. Exhibit IX Return on Operating Capital (Rs. Million) As at 31, March 2003 Fixed assets Technical know-how Working capital Total Operating profit after interest and depreciation Pre-tax return on operating capital exmployed Source: Bajaj Auto Annual Report, 2002-03. As at 31, March 2002 10,910 128 699 11,737 4,834 41% 10,502 107 638 11,247 6,744 60% Exhibit X Dividend Payouts (%) Company Bajaj Hero Honda TVS 1999 19. 18 22. 89 21. 96 2000 20. 88 23. 08 23. 92 2001 35. 69 26. 74 32. 54 2002 27. 34 75. 53 42. 47 Source: Businessworld, 19th May 2003. Capital Structure Bajaj’s debt-equity ratio was 0. 6 and interest coverage was 717. 76 times in 2003. Bajaj mostly relied on internal generation rather than external funding. In 2003, Bajaj had Rs. 3139. 42 crore of reserve & surplus (49% of it total assets), where as Hero Honda and TVS had only Rs. 821. 09 crore and Rs. 399. 85 crore respectively. Bajaj deployed bulk of its funds in investments (44. 02% of total assets) and fixed assets (20 . 57% of total assets). 14 M. Anand, ? Is Munjal Being Too Generous Businessworld, 19th May 2003. 118 Financial Management at Bajaj Auto Exhibit XI Bajaj: Equity Holding, December 2003 Equity Holding Indian promoters Mutual funds and UTI Banks, FI's, Insurance Cos.FIIs Private corporate bodies Indian public NRIs/OCBs Any other Total equity holding Source: Prowess Database. No of Shares 29516461 1612731 3829868 19318255 13264490 29054237 401776 4185692 101183510 % of Total Shares 29. 17 1. 59 3. 79 19. 09 13. 11 28. 71 0. 40 4. 14 100 In September 2000, Bajaj had spent about Rs 720 crore to buy back 15% of its equity. The offer was announced at a price of Rs 400 per share when the prevailing price was around Rs 320. Though prices fell to Rs 200 immediately after the buyback, it had later recovered to about Rs 500. Bajaj believed buy back was a better way to distribute profits to shareholders than dividends.Bajaj had a cash reserve of $ 575 million and paid a final dividend of 120% an d a special dividend of 20% in 2002 (paid on account of the one-time premia received from Allianz AG, Germany, the company's partner in the two insurance joint ventures)15 and a final dividend of 140% in 2003. The amount of dividend and the tax aggregated to Rs. 1,598 million. The company’s dividend yield i. e. , (dividend per share by the market price) showed that Bajaj had a yield of 2. 7%. 16 Looking Ahead In the motorcycles segment, ‘Boxer' had performed well and had increased its market share to 45% in the entry-level market, which was estimated at 102,000 units (35% of total motorcycle sales). But growth was primarily led by ‘Pulsar', the premium-end motorcycle. Against the company's estimate of 10,000 units per month at the beginning of 2002, the model notched sales of around 17,000 units per month in late 2002.Encouraged by the success, Bajaj planned to ramp up sales to 25,000 units per month by early 2004 and expected to achieve total leadership in the mo torcycle segment, aiming at a growth rate of 15%. Bajaj expected to improve its relationships with customers by expanding its product range and widening its dealer network. It planned to launch a 125 cc motorcycle with Kawasaki Heavy Industries Ltd, which was in the final stage of development. A rear engine diesel goods carrier was in the testing stage 15 16 Source: Prowess Database. Chetan Soni & Nandini Sen Gupta, ? Rolling stock: Payouts put auto investors in top gear,? Times News Network, 4th June 2003. 119 Financial Insights and would be launched in 2004. Bajaj also planned to broaden its vision and work towards being a truly global player.Effective management of the company’s finances would play an important role in this regard. Figure (iii) Bajaj: Closing Share Price & Traded Quantity Source: Prowess Database. Figure (iv) Bajaj: Traded Quantity Source: Prowess Database. Figure (v) Bajaj: Dividend Yield & Earning Per Share Dividend Yield 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 Dec-97 Dec-98 Dec- 99 Dec-00 Dec-01 Dec-02 Dec-03 Jun-98 Jun-99 Jun-00 Jun-01 Jun-02 Jun-03 Earning Per Share 80 60 40 20 0 Dec-97 Jun-98 Dec-98 Jun-99 Dec-99 Jun-00 Dec-00 Jun-01 Dec-01 Jun-02 Dec-02 Jun-03 Dec-03 Source: Prowess Database. 120 Financial Management at Bajaj Auto Figure (vi) Bajaj: Assets Structure Source: Prowess Database. Exhibit: XIIBajaj: Capital History Issue Month Issue Type Face Value (Rs. ) 10 10 Security Amount (Rs. Crore) 0 0 Additional Increased Paid up Paid up Capital Capital (Rs. Crore) (Rs. Crore) 18. 81 37. 63 37. 63 75. 25 Security Type Sep-91 Bonus Jun-94 Bonus Euro Oct-94 Issue Sep-97 Bonus Equity Equity Global Depository Receipts Equity 10 10 10 345. 07 0 0 4. 34 39. 8 0 79. 59 119. 39 101. 18 Buybac Sep-00 k Equity Source: Prowess Database. Exhibit XIII Bajaj: Ratios Bajaj Auto Ratios Liquidity Ratios Current ratio Quick ratio Solvency Ratios Debt-equity ratio Interest coverage 0. 26 0. 22 0. 20 45. 04 0. 16 33. 85 0. 17 21. 23 0. 11 11. 83 0. 29 18. 43 0. 52 5. 63 0. 6 4. 58 2. 07 1. 20 1. 88 1. 01 1. 69 0. 69 1. 11 0. 16 1. 20 0. 25 1. 44 0. 81 1. 01 0. 34 1. 12 0. 47 1. 16 0. 36 2003 2002 2001 Hero Honda 2003 2002 2001 T V S Motor 2003 2002 2001 717. 76 161. 91 121 Financial Insights Bajaj Auto Ratios 2003 2002 2001 Hero Honda 2003 2002 2001 T V S Motor 2003 2002 2001 Efficiency Ratios (in Days) Average days of finished goods stock Average days of debtors Average days of creditors Net working capital cycle Profitability Ratios PBDIT (NNRT) as % of sales PBIT (NNRT) as % of sales PAT (NNRT) as % of sales Return on net worth Return on capital employed 20. 19 16. 65 11. 07 17. 50 21. 47 16. 87 13. 12 8. 63 13. 3 16. 74 13. 07 9. 18 8. 24 10. 26 9. 98 17. 59 16. 45 10. 02 67. 10 94. 64 16. 77 15. 63 9. 72 67. 67 95. 27 14. 46 13. 07 7. 87 47. 52 70. 98 9. 23 6. 66 3. 94 32. 89 42. 10 6. 79 4. 57 2. 47 8. 18 5. 78 3. 47 9. 90 13. 80 42. 40 -5. 68 10. 27 13. 95 43. 47 0. 69 11. 38 15. 42 49. 54 6. 61 3. 91 8. 62 35. 57 -7. 47 3. 53 5. 80 32. 71 - 4. 79 3. 93 4. 28 31. 10 14. 09 8. 14 52. 96 14. 97 13. 13 15. 95 19. 82 52. 05 44. 89 -1. 24 7. 54 2. 05 -14. 15 16. 05 18. 80 20. 86 20. 74 90. 00 80. 00 Dividend rate (sum of interim and final) 140. 00 140. 00 Market Ratios P/E P/B 16. 61 3. 19 9. 54 1. 63 80. 00 900. 00 850. 00 150. 00 120. 00 9. 25 1. 32 3. 46 7. 63 9. 27 5. 62 13. 66 6. 21 18. 41 5. 02 10. 35 10. 39 3. 08 0. 99 Source: Prowess Database. Exhibit XIV Common size Income statement Commonsize Income Statement 2003 Total Revenue Sales Other income Change in stocks Non-recurring income Bajaj Auto 2002 2001 Hero Honda 2003 2002 2001 2003 TVS 2002 2001 100. 00 100. 00 100. 00 100. 00 100. 00 100. 00 100. 00 100. 00 100. 00 94. 22 3. 51 0. 64 1. 64 92. 27 4. 22 -0. 67 4. 18 91. 85 6. 18 0. 36 1. 61 97. 76 0. 44 0. 40 1. 40 98. 24 1. 04 -0. 13 0. 85 98. 75 0. 33 0. 56 0. 35 97. 76 0. 67 1. 25 0. 31 98. 96 0. 89 0. 15 0. 01 98. 04 1. 05 0. 90 0. 01 122 Financial Management at Bajaj AutoCommonsize Income Statement 2003 Exp enditure Raw materials, stores, etc. Wages & salaries Energy (power & fuel) Indirect taxes (excise, etc. ) Advertising & marketing expenses Distribution expenses Others Non-recurring expenses Profits / losses PBDIT Financial charges (incl. lease rent) PBDT Depreciation PBT Tax provision PAT Bajaj Auto 2002 2001 Hero Honda 2003 2002 2001 2003 TVS 2002 2001 52. 84 4. 66 1. 19 11. 73 51. 39 5. 12 1. 41 11. 80 52. 79 6. 20 1. 80 14. 57 67. 59 3. 86 0. 49 0. 19 68. 80 3. 71 0. 56 0. 12 72. 87 3. 67 0. 73 0. 19 60. 37 3. 27 0. 66 13. 69 63. 29 3. 37 0. 69 13. 86 73. 20 3. 46 0. 90 1. 72 8. 61 0. 86 3. 50 1. 63 19. 3 8. 62 0. 82 5. 28 0. 69 19. 06 9. 83 0. 90 4. 93 2. 85 10. 77 4. 16 1. 89 4. 57 0. 07 18. 51 2. 99 1. 88 5. 55 0. 22 17. 10 2. 74 1. 81 4. 12 0. 46 14. 18 11. 06 2. 08 3. 92 0. 10 9. 23 8. 37 2. 12 4. 65 0. 04 6. 69 8. 76 1. 60 4. 69 0. 04 7. 99 0. 02 19. 01 3. 34 15. 67 5. 24 10. 43 0. 07 18. 99 3. 47 15. 52 4. 06 11. 46 0. 19 10. 58 3. 57 7. 01 0. 68 6. 33 0. 48 18. 04 1. 11 16. 93 5. 81 11. 12 0. 72 16. 38 1. 12 15. 26 5. 08 10. 17 1. 09 13. 09 1. 38 11. 72 4. 04 7. 67 0. 35 8. 88 2. 51 6. 36 2. 30 4. 06 0. 80 5. 89 2. 20 3. 69 1. 28 2. 41 1. 24 6. 75 2. 35 4. 40 1. 03 3. 37 Source: Prowess Database. Exhibit XV Common size Balance SheetCommon size Balance Sheet 2003 Total assets Gross fixed assets Land & building Plant & machinery Other fixed assets Capital WIP Bajaj Auto 2002 2001 Hero Honda 2003 2002 2001 2003 TVS 2002 2001 100. 00 100. 00 100. 00 100. 00 100. 00 100. 00 100. 00 100. 00 100. 00 41. 62 4. 02 35. 09 2. 45 0. 06 46. 97 4. 65 39. 56 2. 69 0. 07 53. 65 5. 30 44. 99 2. 88 0. 48 35. 60 5. 77 28. 21 1. 20 0. 42 40. 72 6. 96 31. 96 1. 25 0. 55 54. 82 7. 93 43. 57 1. 68 1. 64 77. 80 12. 72 58. 45 4. 01 2. 63 78. 81 10. 14 63. 09 4. 22 1. 35 77. 23 10. 39 59. 41 4. 40 3. 04 123 Financial Insights Common size Balance Sheet 2003 Less: cumulative depreciation Net fixed assets Investments In group / associate cos.In mutual funds Other investments Inventory Raw materials Stores and spares Finished goods Semi-finished goods Sundry debtors Accrued income Advances / loans to Group / associate cos. Advances / loans to Other cos. Deposits with govt. / agencies Advance payment of tax Other receivables Cash & bank balance Deferred tax assets Intangible assets & deferred revenue expenditure not written off Bajaj Auto 2002 2001 Hero Honda 2003 2002 2001 2003 TVS 2002 2001 21. 05 20. 57 44. 02 4. 13 3. 50 36. 39 3. 30 0. 89 0. 34 1. 82 0. 25 2. 65 0. 32 21. 67 25. 30 36. 82 4. 75 2. 29 29. 78 3. 31 1. 00 0. 57 1. 44 0. 30 3. 66 0. 47 24. 30 29. 35 25. 89 1. 46 2. 64 21. 79 5. 46 1. 96 0. 91 2. 23 0. 36 2. 60 0. 71 12. 47 23. 13 54. 3 0. 16 54. 37 0. 00 9. 18 5. 10 1. 14 2. 51 0. 43 6. 46 0. 00 12. 74 27. 98 41. 41 0. 20 41. 21 0. 00 10. 17 6. 17 1. 54 1. 94 0. 52 5. 69 0. 00 15. 55 39. 27 26. 18 0. 30 25. 88 0. 00 17. 18 10. 62 2. 32 3. 16 1. 08 3. 66 0. 00 28. 15 49. 65 8. 19 5. 60 2. 57 0. 02 19. 95 3. 89 4. 13 10. 36 1. 58 4. 87 0. 00 28. 18 50. 63 1. 66 1. 60 0. 00 0. 05 17. 15 4. 24 2. 50 8. 44 1. 97 9. 97 0. 00 24. 69 52. 54 1. 79 1. 68 0. 00 0. 12 18. 32 5. 49 2. 13 8. 46 2. 25 12. 89 0. 00 1. 68 3. 56 0. 11 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 1. 16 1. 60 8. 21 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 1. 43 4. 49 1. 86 0. 06 0. 40 0. 41 0. 01 0. 01 0. 11 0. 08 0. 02 3. 93 21. 99 2. 52 0. 8 1. 08 21. 04 2. 28 0. 47 0. 84 21. 71 4. 74 0. 46 0. 00 0. 52 4. 48 1. 11 0. 04 0. 59 7. 31 6. 21 0. 05 0. 88 7. 08 3. 90 0. 00 0. 00 7. 59 7. 69 0. 55 0. 59 6. 48 8. 56 0. 41 0. 77 5. 93 1. 92 0. 00 0. 17 0. 24 0. 35 0. 53 0. 58 1. 75 0. 00 0. 03 0. 05 124 Financial Management at Bajaj Auto Common size Balance Sheet 2003 Total liabilities Net worth Paid-up equity capital Reserves & surplus Secured borrowings Unsecured borrowings Deferred tax liabilities Current liabilities Sundry creditors Interest accrued / due Other current liabilities Provisions Tax provision Dividend provision Dividend tax provision Other provisions Bajaj Auto 2002 2001He ro Honda 2003 2002 2001 2003 TVS 2002 2001 100. 00 100. 00 100. 00 100. 00 100. 00 100. 00 100. 00 100. 00 100. 00 51. 36 1. 60 49. 75 0. 85 12. 46 3. 81 7. 21 6. 56 0. 00 0. 65 24. 30 21. 01 2. 25 0. 29 0. 76 52. 99 1. 87 51. 12 0. 59 10. 99 4. 36 8. 41 7. 60 0. 00 0. 81 22. 65 19. 56 2. 62 0. 00 0. 47 56. 80 2. 18 54. 62 1. 21 9. 86 0. 00 10. 07 7. 70 0. 00 2. 37 22. 06 19. 77 1. 74 0. 18 0. 37 39. 34 1. 82 37. 52 0. 00 6. 14 3. 53 31. 14 18. 73 0. 00 12. 41 19. 86 0. 50 16. 42 2. 10 0. 84 39. 10 2. 28 36. 82 0. 00 6. 64 4. 07 34. 97 22. 73 0. 00 12. 24 15. 22 0. 48 13. 66 0. 00 1. 08 54. 44 3. 46 50. 98 0. 00 5. 75 0. 00 31. 63 22. 03 0. 00 9. 60 8. 18 0. 82 5. 18 0. 3 1. 64 39. 42 2. 15 37. 27 3. 82 7. 54 8. 27 37. 87 37. 81 0. 00 0. 06 3. 08 0. 00 1. 51 0. 19 1. 38 37. 27 2. 66 34. 61 10. 50 8. 74 9. 14 33. 31 33. 08 0. 00 0. 24 1. 04 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 1. 04 43. 06 2. 78 40. 28 19. 09 9. 09 0. 00 25. 55 25. 51 0. 00 0. 05 3. 20 0. 00 2. 23 0. 23 0. 75 Source: Prowess Database. Exhibit XVI Comparative Income Statement Comparative Income Statement 2001 Total Revenue Sales Other income Change in stocks Non-recurring income 3628. 74 4172. 1 4829. 37 3177. 2 4471. 87 5107. 7 1820. 98 2213. 59 3111. 28 244. 19 190. 61 179. 85 14. 13 -30. 4 32. 58 83. 93 10. 63 18. 17 11. 42 47. 21 -5. 81 38. 54 23. 24 21. 08 72. 8 19. 57 16. 65 0. 27 19. 8 3. 27 0. 23 21. 4 39. 82 9. 94 Bajaj Auto 2002 2003 Hero Honda 2001 2002 2003 2001 TVS 2002 2003 63. 66 189. 21 125 Financial Insights Comparative Income Statement 2001 Expenditure Raw materials, stores, etc. Wages & salaries Energy (power & fuel) Indirect taxes (excise, etc. ) Bajaj Auto 2002 2003 Hero Honda 2001 2002 2003 2001 TVS 2002 2003 2085. 47 2323. 71 2708. 23 2344. 39 3131. 72 3531. 81 1359. 65 1415. 78 1921. 32 245. 14 231. 48 239. 05 117. 96 168. 94 201. 63 64. 26 75. 37 104. 05 71. 03 63. 64 61. 12 23. 4 5. 98 25. 61 5. 39 25. 82 9. 75 16. 63 15. 44 20. 85 575. 8 533. 48 601. 22 31. 88 309. 94 435. 77Advertising & marketing expenses 204. 94 200. 41 233. 29 Distribution expenses Others 35. 46 37. 02 44. 23 64. 17 58. 1 93. 73 147. 01 119. 04 118. 49 212. 49 85. 39 98. 92 29. 64 47. 36 66. 27 194. 82 238. 63 179. 61 132. 45 252. 48 238. 84 31. 25 83. 7 14. 65 10. 24 3. 86 87. 15 103. 91 124. 72 0. 83 0. 86 3. 28 Non-recurring expenses 112. 59 Profits / losses PBDIT Financial charges (incl. lease rent) PBDT Depreciation PBT Tax provision PAT ppropriation of profits Dividends Retained earnings 425. 47 861. 9 975. 28 456. 32 778. 31 967. 36 148. 39 149. 74 293. 69 7. 4 3. 38 1. 12 35. 1 44. 27 32. 92 51. 01 24. 82 57. 98 303. 8 22. 97 43. 73 81. 69 19. 12 62. 7 17. 96 49. 22 28. 61 11. 24 79. 91 73. 19 418. 07 858. 52 974. 16 421. 22 745. 39 942. 54 125. 42 131. 78 282. 45 141. 12 156. 68 171. 16 276. 95 701. 84 803 376. 95 694. 38 884. 56 82. 56 202. 54 53. 95 129. 35 27 183. 68 268. 36 130. 08 231. 45 249. 95 518. 16 534. 64 246. 87 462. 93 580. 76 89. 21 141. 66 159. 81 160. 74 66. 01 349. 67 405. 49 20. 36 42. 21 22. 91 31. 04 29. 79 99. 56 376. 5 374. 83 180. 86 113. 26 175. 27 Source: Prowess Database. Exhibit XVII Comparative Balance Sheet Comparative Balance Sheet (Rs Crore) Assets Gross fixed assets 2001 Bajaj 2002 2003 Hero Honda 2001 633. 61 2002 714. 21 2003 779. 25 TVS Motor 2001 641. 3 2002 683. 85 2003 834. 7 2490. 26 2540. 08 2626. 18 126 Financial Management at Bajaj Auto Comparative Balance Sheet (Rs Crore) Land & building Plant & machinery Other fixed assets Capital WIP Less: cumulative depreciation Net fixed assets Investments In group / associate cos. In mutual funds Other investments Inventories Raw materials Stores and spares Finished goods Semi-finished goods Receivables Sundry debtors Accrued income Advances / loans to Group / associate cos. Advances / loans to Other cos. Deposits with govt. / agencies Advance payment of tax Other receivables Cash & bank balance Deferred tax assets Intangible assets (goodwill, etc. Deferred revenue expenditure not written off 245. 85 Bajaj 251. 53 Hero Honda 253. 42 Mar-00 May-00 May-00 503. 59 19. 45 18. 95 179. 76 453. 85 302. 59 3. 46 299. 13 0 198. 54 122. 79 26. 81 36. 47 12. 47 135. 54 42. 29 0 560. 54 21. 89 9. 69 223. 47 490. 74 617. 32 26. 37 9. 19 273. 01 506. 24 TVS Motor 86. 24 493. 09 36. 49 25. 21 204. 92 436. 11 14. 89 13. 92 0 0. 97 152. 03 45. 53 17. 65 70. 2 18. 65 210. 64 106. 95 0. 04 88. 03 547. 47 36. 66 11. 69 244. 54 439. 31 14. 39 13. 92 0 0. 47 148. 79 36. 76 21. 73 73. 23 17. 07 187. 09 86. 52 0 136. 47 627. 07 42. 97 28. 19 302. 03 532. 67 87. 92 60. 08 27. 58 0. 26 214. 07 41. 71 44. 32 111. 1 16. 94 149. 87 52. 21 0 088. 17 2139. 11 2214. 16 133. 81 22. 43 1127. 91 145. 48 3. 96 154. 59 4. 01 1171. 8 1327. 95 1362. 35 1368. 28 1298. 23 1201. 65 1991. 42 2777. 68 67. 62 122. 77 257. 02 123. 99 260. 88 220. 77 726. 29 1193. 52 3. 46 3. 46 722. 83 1190. 06 0 178. 36 108. 27 26. 96 34. 02 9. 11 238. 52 99. 72 0 0 200. 92 111. 67 25. 04 54. 84 9. 37 251. 26 141. 49 0 1011. 26 1610. 41 2296. 03 253. 43 91 42. 17 103. 49 16. 77 179. 1 54. 32 30. 57 77. 95 16. 26 207. 98 56. 16 21. 15 114. 63 16. 04 1786. 88 1785. 53 1917. 13 120. 72 33. 01 198. 17 25. 34 167. 04 20. 24 5. 3 380. 88 19. 24 192. 75 86. 6 21. 73 106 73. 11 3. 87 1387. 8 159. 07 30. 03 68. 06 10. 68 0 1. 26 10. 14 81. 85 45. 09 0 0 0 0 0. 21 10. 34 128. 25 108. 96 0. 81 0 0 0 0. 32 11. 31 98. 14 24. 33 0. 89 0 0 15. 43 32. 66 6. 38 49. 18 15. 91 0 0 0 39 0. 14 5. 16 56. 27 74. 27 3. 57 0 0 15. 3 0. 86 0. 03 81. 47 82. 46 5. 9 0 1007. 75 1137. 62 219. 98 21. 32 0 0 123. 32 25. 2 45. 48 12. 8 16. 03 0 0 20. 2 10. 22 11. 52 0. 44 0. 3 0 127 Financial Insights Comparative Balance Sheet (Rs Crore) Share issue expenses not written off VRS expenses not written off Other misc. expenses not written off Total assets Net worth Authorized capital Issued equity capital Paid-up equity capital Bonus equity capital Buy back amount Buy back shares (nos. Reserves & surplus Free reserves Specific reserv es Borrowings Bank borrowings Short term bank borrowings Long term bank borrowings Govt. / sales tax deferral borrowings Debentures / bonds Fixed deposits Other borrowings Secured borrowings Unsecured borrowings Bajaj Hero Honda TVS Motor 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0. 44 0 0. 3 0 0 0 16. 03 0 0 20. 2 10. 22 11. 52 0 830. 02 357. 41 25 23. 1 23. 1 0 0 0 334. 31 291. 81 42. 5 233. 95 107. 37 76. 12 31. 25 0 0 4641. 66 5407. 81 6309. 79 1155. 81 2636. 53 2865. 79 3240. 61 150 101. 18 101. 18 114. 17 18. 21 1820730 4 2535. 35 150 101. 19 101. 19 114. 17 0 0 150 101. 19 101. 19 114. 17 0 0 629. 19 50 39. 94 39. 94 23. 96 0 0 589. 25 589. 25 0 66. 48 0 0 0 1753. 9 2188. 68 685. 76 50 39. 94 39. 94 23. 96 0 0 645. 82 645. 2 0 116. 44 0 0 0 861. 03 50 39. 94 39. 94 23. 96 0 0 821. 09 821. 09 0 134. 28 0 0 0 867. 72 1072. 89 323. 39 25 23. 1 23. 1 0 0 0 300. 29 270. 59 29. 7 166. 94 53. 64 34. 89 18. 75 422. 95 25 23. 1 23. 1 0 0 0 399. 85 380. 05 19. 8 121. 89 16. 13 16. 13 0 2764. 6 3139. 42 2515. 39 2744. 64 3121. 21 19. 96 513. 71 55. 97 55. 97 0 19. 96 626. 09 31. 83 31. 83 0 18. 21 840. 23 53. 91 53. 91 0 451. 64 0 6. 1 0 55. 97 457. 74 588. 96 0 5. 3 0 31. 83 594. 26 781. 9 0 4. 42 0 53. 91 786. 32 66. 48 0 0 0 0 66. 48 116. 44 0 0 0 0 116. 44 134. 28 0 0 0 0 134. 28 0 85 0 41. 58 158. 49 75. 46 0 59. 4 0 53. 9 91. 11 75. 83 0 39. 6 0 66. 16 41. 03 80. 86 128Financial Management at Bajaj Auto Comparative Balance Sheet (Rs Crore) Current portion of long term debt Total foreign currency borrowings Deferred tax liabilities Current liabilities & provisions Current liabilities Sundry creditors Interest accrued / due Other current liabilities Share application money Provisions Tax provision Dividend provision Dividend tax provision Other provisions Total liabilities Bajaj Hero Honda TVS Motor 0 0 0 0 0 0 65. 38 36 11. 48 0 0 0 236. 05 0 240. 47 0 0 0 0 71. 47 77. 16 0 0 0 79. 35 0 88. 72 1491. 42 1679. 88 1988. 48 467. 55 357. 29 0. 11 110. 15 454. 93 411. 13 0. 1 43. 7 454. 9 413. 86 0. 08 40. 96 460. 14 365. 62 254. 61 0 111. 01 880. 3 1116. 21 613. 32 398. 61 0 214. 71 681. 52 409. 94 0 271. 58 238. 66 212. 1 211. 71 0 0. 39 298. 04 289. 05 287 0 2. 05 439. 33 406. 26 405. 65 0 0. 61 0 0 0 0. 02 94. 52 9. 51 59. 9 6. 11 19 0. 02 266. 91 8. 34 239. 64 0 18. 93 0 434. 69 10. 9 359. 44 46. 05 18. 3 0 26. 56 0 18. 48 1. 88 6. 2 830. 02 0 8. 99 0 0 0 8. 99 0 33. 07 0 16. 17 2. 07 14. 83 1023. 87 1224. 95 1533. 58 917. 58 1057. 94 1325. 98 80. 95 8. 26 17. 08 141. 66 0 25. 35 141. 66 18. 15 47. 79 4641. 66 5407. 81 6309. 79 1155. 81 1753. 9 2188. 68 867. 72 1072. 89 Source: Prowess Database. 129 Financial Insights Bibliography 1. 2. ?The BT 500,? Business Today, 7th September 1998.Gita Piramal, Sumantra Goshal and Sudeep Budhiraja, ? Transformation of Bajaj Auto Ltd,? Lessons in Excellence Case Contest, www. thesmartmanager. com, February-March, 2003. M. Anand, ? Is Munjal Being Too Generous Businessworld, 19th May 2003. B19th May Chetan Soni & Nandin i Sen Gupta, ? Rolling stock: Payouts put auto investors in top gear,? Times News Network, 4th June 2003. Motilal Oswal, Equity Research, February 2003. Honda Annual Report 2003. Bajaj Auto Limited Annual Report 2003. CMIE – Prowess Database. CMIE – Industry Analysis Service. www. bajajauto. com. www. siamindia. com. www. indiainfoline. com. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 130

Figurative Language in Verbal Communication Literature review

Figurative Language in Verbal Communication - Literature review Example It is evidently clear from the discussion that gaining knowledge of the function of figurative language in effective communication necessitates an understanding of the interpersonal processes of everyday interaction. Individuals express themselves figuratively for purposes of civility, to escape liability for the introduction of what is conveyed, to articulate insights that are hard to communicate employing exact language, and to articulate ideas in a dense and vibrant way (Jacques 2006). Hence, figurative language is employed to articulate and induce emotions in numerous forms of conversational contexts. Politics is an excellent domain to view how figurative language may be used particularly to induce specific emotions (Jacques 2006), which may consequently affect an individual’s perception of several issues. Politicians are prominent, or controversial, for their application of figurative language to stir up emotions. Take for instance the deliberation that occurred in 1991 i n the U.S. Senate over whether the nation should intervene militarily against Iraq for its attack on Kuwait (Sadri & Flammia 2011). Figurative language was extensively exercised by the Democrats and the Republican to strengthen their arguments. For example, a Republican senator attempted to stir up the public’s emotional reaction to Hussein by portraying him in dramatic figurative expressions (Sadri & Flammia 2011: 156): Saddam Hussein is like a glutton—a geopolitical glutton. He is sitting down at a big banquet table, overflowing with goodies. And let me tell you—like every glutton, he is going to have them all. Kuwait is just the appetizer. He is gobbling it up—but it is not going to satisfy him. After a noisy belch or two, he is going to reach across the table for the next morsel. What is it going to be? Saudi Arabia? He is going to keep grabbing and gobbling. It is time to let this grisly glutton know the free lunch is over. It is time for him to pay the bill. Hence, this paper argues that figurative language can communicate understated indications of meaning in a manner that exact language cannot. Specifically, various figurative terms strongly express an individual’s figurative idea of the emotional encounter. Various empirical and linguistic scholars substantiate this assumption (Walch Publishing 2007). Moreover, according to Jacques (2006), one indication of meaning that metaphorical language may convey is the extent of emotion. In everyday life, individuals do not merely reveal emotional encounters with partners, friends, and family members, but these emotional encounters may comprise these family members and close friends in varied ways. Due to this, emotional communication is prone to be moderated by issues of face management and by standards of self-recognition of emotions (Walch Publishing 2007). A number of studies have reported findings consistent with the assumption that face management issues and social stand ards influence emotional communication.  

Issues in Human Resource Management Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 4250 words

Issues in Human Resource Management - Essay Example The qualities of an effectively managed employee according to Roosevelt T. [1978], relate to his ability to answer for himself and others the following five basic job related questions: i.Why am I here [How does he identify himself within the organiation] ii.Where am I going [What is his understanding of the goals of his unit and/or that of the entire organization How can he be a part of achieving that goal The manager is to let him know all these]. iii. How am I doing [He needs to know his performance and progress towards achieving the overall goal and objective of his unit/organisation]. iv. What is in it for me [What are the rewards for him for achieving results] v. What happens when I need help [How are they reinforced for doing good job What is the process of delivering the reward A manager can define for the subordinates what rewards he can give within a specific context]. An average worker and an average employer will expect the following from each other under a typical employment contract: EXPECTATIONS By Manager By Worker T O R E C E I V E Cooperative effort Problem solving by the worker Considerable self management Production beyond the minimum required Improvements in overall group performance Open communications of any unresolved problem Cooperative effort Some problem solving Some self management Service beyond the minimum required Performances as required T O G I V E T O G I V E * Adequate compensation Sense of belonging to company Sense of importance Sense of accomplishment Sense of purpose Training & knowledge Sense of fulfillmentAdequate compensation Sense of belonging Sense of accomplishment Sense of being valued T O R E C E I V E *In this instance, "to give"... Does the manager/management carry along the staff Do they have any definite goals/objectives to which their efforts could be channeled Are the mission and vision of the organization clearly made known to the staff v. What happens when I need help [How are they reinforced for doing good job What is the process of delivering the reward A manager can define for the subordinates what rewards he can give within a specific context]. *In this instance, "to give" should read as "to facilitate realisation of." [Adapted from Lashrook 1981b, Leader Manager] and supported by Rensis Likert and Jane Gibson Likert,[Integrative Goals & Consensus in Problem Solving] Rosabeth Moss Kanter [Empowerment] and Roger Harrison [Strategy for a New Age]. Things such as reducing time spent at work, spiraling wages, fringe benefits, etc have at one time or the other failed to bring out the expected result from an employee. It goes to suggest that it takes more than these incentives to motivate some people in order to get the best out of them, i.e. in terms of job performance and behaviour. In his hygiene factors/motivation, Herzberg tries to explain that certain issues bring job satisfaction and certain issues cause job dissatisfaction. Herzberg's studies revealed that the factors involved in producing job satisfaction [motivators] are separate and distinct from those that lead to job dissatisfaction.

A global look at quality managemenr in universities Research Paper

A global look at quality managemenr in universities - Research Paper Example Universities across the world have been positing themselves as â€Å"world-class† in view of the market opportunities presented by globalization (Xavier and Alsagoff, 2013). In a global scenario, quality and perception of quality of a university is defined and determined by many internal as well as external mechanisms. In this context, quality of education has become a decisive factor while determining the management strategy for any university (Dobrzanski and Roszak, 2007, p.223). Xavier and Alsagoff (2013) have observed how universities present themselves as â€Å"world-class† to the global markets through many strategies, thereby attracting students from all over the world. Any examination of the quality of universities in global context will have to start with addressing the questions, what is defined by quality, and whether there are global standards of quality in education (Paradeise and Thoenig, 2013, p.189). Quality in the context of university education is ofte n defined as: Expression of significant range of educational effectiveness and reflection of a new approach in which need of systematic evaluation of undertaken activities is taking essential meaning including improvement and making endeavors towards accreditation which aim to confirm that all the standards of educational effectiveness are provided† (Dobrzanski and Roszak, 2007, p.223-4). Quality of university education can also be defined in terms of financial effectiveness, academic standards, and public usefulness as well (Dobrzanski and Roszak, 2007, p.224). ... This is an approach that ensures participation, plans long-term, aims at â€Å"customer satisfaction†, and brings benefits to all the academic and social stakeholders (Becket and Brookes, n.d., p.43). Fotopoulos and Psomas (2008) have studied TQM in the context of Greece and observed that any TQM model must have a â€Å"soft† and â€Å"hard† side, the â€Å"soft† side being a plan to address long term issues and related to â€Å"leadership, employee empowerment and culture† (p.151). The â€Å"hard† side on the other hand refers to â€Å"quality improvement tools and techniques† (Fotopoulos and Psomas, 2008, p.151). It is pointed out by Fotopoulos and Psomas (2008) that â€Å"there is no unique model for a good TQM programme and TQM is a network of interdependent elements, namely, critical factors, practices, techniques and tools† (Fotopoulos and Psomas, 2008, p.151). Yet, there have been a number of â€Å"TQM elements† id entified through various research projects and they are, leadership, strategic quality planning, employee management and involvement, supplier management, customer focus, process management, continuous improvement, information and analysis, knowledge and education, and TQM tools such as â€Å"flow charts, relations diagram, scatter diagram, control charts, pareto analysis, quality function deployment, design of experiments and so on† (Fotopoulos and Psomas, 2008, p.152-3). There are widely accepted quality frame works for universities other than TQM such as European Framework for Quality Management (EFQM) and SERVQUAL that approaches the issue from the customers' â€Å"perspective† (Becket and Brookes, n.d., p.43). The dynamics of the process of attaining

The Divergence of U.S. & U.K Takeover Regulations Essay

The Divergence of U.S. & U.K Takeover Regulations - Essay Example In their article, The Divergence of U.S. and UK Takeover Regulation (2007), Armour and Skeel note that takeover is the persistent bid by one company (bidder) to acquire the business of another (target), or the process by which the bidder acquires the target company. When the term regulation is incorporated into this definition, takeover regulation denotes the practice of monitoring and controlling the bidder-target interaction so that the underlying takeover deal is fair to all stakeholders involved. This process is actually regulated by legal provisions both in the U.S and the UK. Having noted divergence in takeover regulation between the U.S and the U.K, it is important to highlight key differential areas. The key areas of divergence in the U.S and UK handling of takeover regulation is the subject matter of Armour and Skeel’s text. While in both countries the takeover process is regulated by law, there are critical variations across the applicable legal framework. In the U.S, for example, defensive tactics by managers are provided for by law. In contrast, the UK takeover system illegalizes the practice of defensive tactics in the event of a materialized takeover. These two countries are noticeably unique in the manner in which they handle takeover regulation. UK system of takeover regulation is primarily driven by self-regulation. On the other hand, self-regulation is little, if any, in the U.S. Furthermore, the application and subsequent use of Delaware laws in the U.S provides a mechanism for litigation as far as takeover regulation is concerned. For this reason, relevant courts and lawyer activities are high in the U.S relative to takeover bids. In the UK, courts and lawyer activities are little, if any. Arising matters, issues, and concerns regarding takeovers are dealt with by the Takeover Panel (Gaughan 88). This divergence informs the UK-based

Woodrow Wilson Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 500 words

Woodrow Wilson - Essay Example While this ship is perhaps the most historically significant, German submarines demonstrated a history of interference with United States ships. While the two countries reached a post-1915 treaty, Germany ultimately decided to break this treaty in 1917, clearing the way for future aggressive actions, including the sinking of five American ships. In addition to German interference with American neutrality, the Zimmerman telegram constituted a major contributing factor for United States involvement. This telegram was sent between Germany and Mexico, intercepted by British intelligence and interpreted. The telegram indicated that if Mexico joined the war on Germany’s side, in victory they would be award the lost territories of Arizona, Texas, and New Mexico. It seems that such a telegram was a valid reason for entering the war. While it would be naà ¯ve to assume that this telegram was a primary reason for the United States involvement, such a telegram clearly demonstrated to the United States public that German aggression extended beyond involvement in Europe but was increasingly advancing to their backyard. Still, it’s clear that United States involvement was inevitability after Germany broke neutrality, such that the Zimmerman telegram was only a pretext. Considering prominent theorists, it’s clear that America had in large part already broken neutrality. Prior to declaring war on Germany the United States had actively contributed to the war effort through supplying the Britain with military supplies and funding. As such, it’s clear that the United States involvement in World War I was not only inevitable recurrent to the Zimmerman telegram, but to an extent had already occurred. Had the United States refrained from entering World War I it’s highly possible history would be greatly altered. The United States involvement ensured that German aggression would be stopped

Chipotle Mexican Grill Essay Example for Free

Chipotle Mexican Grill Essay Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. is a chain of restaurants located in the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and France, specializing in burritos and tacos. Its name derives from chipotle, the Mexican Spanish name for a smoked and dried jalapeno chili pepper. The restaurant is known for its large burritos, assembly-line production and use of natural ingredients. The company has released a mission statement called Food with Integrity, which highlights its efforts in using organic ingredients,[3] and serves more naturally raised meat than any other restaurant chain. Chipotle is one of the first chains of fast casual dining establishments. Founded by Steve Ells in 1993, Chipotle had 16 restaurants (all in Colorado) when McDonalds Corporation became a major investor in 1998. By the time McDonalds fully divested itself from Chipotle in 2006, the chain had grown to over 500 locations. With more than 1400 locations in 43 U. S. states, Washington, D. C. , two Canadian provinces, the United Kingdom, and France, Chipotle had a net income in 2012 of US$278 million and a staff of 37,310 employees. Chipotle Mexican Grill in 2012 2012 has been the year of Chipotle Mexican Grill (CMG -0. 92%). The stock is an absolute superstar, hitting 37 new record highs so far, according to CNBC. -When the company went public in January 2006, the stock doubled on its first day from $22 per share to close at $44 per share. At late of Febuary 2012, Chipotles stock price had climbed to $380-$385,up more than 80% since january 1,2011 and up 334% since january. Chipotle shares traded at $421. 37 Mar 27, and are up nearly 26% this year. Over the last 12 months, the stock has gained 65%. Chipotles run has obviously been the subject of much chatter among investors. Why is this stock so high, and how much further can it go? Many investors think that Chipotles numbers are just headed up, and the stock has room to grow as well. Chipotles growth is mentioned with the launch of ShopHouse, the Asian-themed restaurant the company has opened in Washington D. C. ShopHouse has been wildly popular with little to no advertising. The success had opened up the possibility that Chipotle could very well strike gold a second time. The company isnt saying much about whether it will expand ShopHouse, but investors are certainly pricing the idea into Chipotle shares. Chipotle has no debt and about $400 million in cash, according to Seeking Alpha. And Chipotle is in that best-of-both worlds position because it can compete directly with fast food, but also stand up against more upscale restaurants, such as Panera Bread (PNRA -1. 01%). Finally, Chipotle is gunning for international expansion, recently opening new locations in London and planning one for Paris.